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Abstract. Unrealized potential of entrepreneurial activities in developing countries has often been 
attributed to missing formal market-based institutions. In new institutional economics, the concept 
of ‘voids’ is suggested as describing an absence of market-based institutions. In reality, however, 
‘institutional fabrics’ are always and necessarily complex and rich in institutions. No societal sphere is 
institutionally void. In the current article we contribute to existing literature on entrepreneurship and 
institutional economics s by presenting a framework for studying the richness and complexities of 
institutional fabrics, as well as ways in which entrepreneurs respond to institutions. Distinguishing 
four types of institutions relevant for entrepreneurs, we analyze case study data from Ethiopia, and 
discuss how ‘tensions’ between potentially incompatible institutions result in behavioral frictions. 
Some entrepreneurs play the complex institutional environment and benefit from the tensions in it, 
whereas others may drown into the institutional ‘swamp’ they face. Policy makers should 
acknowledge that institutions not only result from formal policy making and that in many cases a 
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diverse set of institutions is needed to facilitate market exchange and solve constraining tensions. 
The diversity that results from initiatives of institutional entrepreneurs may create a more effective 
institutional environment for development.  
 
Key words: developing countries; institutional entrepreneurship; institutional fabrics; institutional 
voids 
JEL codes: D02, K20, L23, M00. O12, O55, P13, Q12 
1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurs are catalysts of economic development (Seelos and Mair 2007; Mair, Marti and 
Ventresca, 2012), but, in developing countries in particular, their potential is not realized (Sutter, 
Webb, Kistruck and Bailey, 2013). This stunted contribution of entrepreneurs to economic 
development is attributed by many to a weak institutional environment (Khanna and Palepu 1997; 
2000; Lee and Kim, 2008; Mair and Marti 2009; Sutter et al. 2013). Institutions prescribing certain 
behaviors and dissuading other behavior (Neale 1987), allow markets to function and firms to at least 
survive, if not to enjoy some measure of success (North 1990; 1991). When institutions are absent, 
markets can be dysfunctional and many firms face a situation too uncertain to be successful. Small 
scale and entrepreneurial firms are particularly vulnerable in a weak institutional environment. 
McKague, Zietsma and Oliver (2016) discussed how in these environments an NGO may help to build 
the social structure of a viable new market. In this contribution we focus on young existing markets 
in a context of institutional plurality and tensions (Oliver, 1991; Mair, Mayer and Lutz, 2015; for a 
general argument, see Dolfsma & Verburg 2008).  
Weakness of institutional environments is defined from a New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
point of view as a dearth of formal, market-based institutions (or their enforcement) (cf. North 
1990). Examples include weak (absent) contract law and property rights law. Whenever such 
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institutions are not present, it is believed that markets operate in a void. Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
introduced the concept of institutional voids to describe such situations. The term ‘institutional void’ 
suggests emptiness, a vacuum that can relatively easily be filled (Mair et al. 2012).  Adding formal, 
market-based institutions, ready-made from other jurisdictions, is then expected to stimulate 
economic development by supporting entrepreneurs.  
In reality, however, as Original Institutional Economics (OIE)  recognizes (Bush 1987; Neale 
1987), neither entrepreneurs, nor other actors in any practice in society1, face institutional voids, 
even for activities where no formal market-based institutions exist in a country (jurisdiction). Instead, 
a rich and complex fabric of other, informal and non-market-based institutions affects them (cf. Mair 
et al. 2012). Informal institutions, or formal institutions that aim to regulate adjacent, non-market 
activities, will impinge on a practice for which no or few formal institutions exist. Formal institutions 
regulating other practices may indirectly affect a focal practice, and informal institutions may directly 
or indirectly affect a focal practice as well.  Any institutional fabric thus is rich and complex even 
when some formal institutions are lacking: no sphere is institutionally void. As institutions are 
developed or emerge to impinge on a different practice than intended, these may clash with others 
to produce tensions in a practice (Dolfsma & Verburg 2008). A tension arises when different 
institutions impinge on the same focal practice yet prescribing behaviors that are inconsistent or 
even in conflict with each other. Tensions arise even when different formal institutions directly 
relevant for a focal practice prescribe different behaviors. An institutional fabric – the totality of 
institutions that actors face who are in a practice - that regulates a focal practice can be riddled with 
institutions that prescribe such diverse behaviors that the actors in it find themselves caught in what 
we call an institutional swamp, unable to act or constrained in developing behaviors they would 
otherwise prefer. Actors caught in an institutional swamp are likely to be less successful 
economically, for instance, since they are vulnerable to unexpected enforcement actions. However, 
                                                          
1 A practice is “. . . any form of activity specified by a system of rules [institutions] which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, 
and so on, and which gives activity its structure” (Rawls 1955, 3) 
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the swamp can also be seen as a challenge, to some actors, as it may give room for institutional 
entrepreneurship that changes the institutional fabric and forms the root for successful 
entrepreneurial activity. 
While previous research on institutions – especially in economics and political science – 
focuses on formal institutions, such an emphasis tends to ignore informal institutions, formal 
institutions primarily intended for other practices, as well as the possibility for all these institutions to 
interact with each other (Rakner and Randall 2011: 60). We argue that the outcomes of institutional 
arrangements can only be understood when taking into account the dynamics of interaction between 
institutions, markets and organizations (Djelic, Nooteboom and Whitley, 2005). Interactions between 
institutions may cause tensions perceived by actors in a focal practice. In the current article we 
provide an analytical framework to understand the ‘on-the-ground dynamics’ and complexities (Mair 
et al. 2012: 819)  in an institutional fabric that is not characterized by voids but by a possible 
institutional swamp. Analyzing all the different institutions impinging on a particular practice - 
entrepreneurial behavior in a well-defined and recognizable market setting – allows us to identify 
tensions resulting from contradicting prescriptions for behavior from diverse institutions, as well as 
heterogeneous responses to tensions. What opportunities and difficulties entrepreneurs face, what 
choices they make, and what chances of success they have, is best understood when realizing that 
institutional spheres are always filled rather than void, but that behaviors prescribed can be in 
conflict.  
We do so by presenting and analyzing empirical data on farmer organizations [cooperatives] 
in a developing country [Ethiopia], as here entrepreneurs are confronted with different types of 
institutions prescribing conflicting or contradicting behaviors. We submit that any practice, even the 
entrepreneurial activities of smallholders producing a highly homogenous agricultural commodity 
such as sesame seed in Humera, Ethiopia - a remote, barren corner of Africa - will have institutions 
that regulate the behavior of actors in it. We argue that this is an interesting setting for 
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understanding an institutional swamp and the behavior of actors. The major reason for this is that 
the sesame market in Ethiopia is quite young and booming in the last decade. As in many developing 
and emerging markets, the institutional fabric that governs decisions of the actors involved is 
changing quickly and, therefore, provides an interesting context for our analysis. The case studies 
show that if the concept of institutional voids is adopted the on-the-ground-dynamics are 
insufficiently understood as too much attention is paid to missing formal market-based institutions, 
while the importance of tensions between these institutions and informal and indirect institutions is 
ignored. This also leads to the neglect of the role of individual actors and collective action to 
accommodate tensions between institutions. Sesame farmers in Ethiopia are much more diverse in 
terms of the resources they have at their disposal, approaches to farming and performance than one 
might expect (Olthaar 2015).  We find that both entrepreneurial failures and successes can better be 
understood and explained when studying the richness and complexities of the institutional 
environment of entrepreneurs, using the framework that we propose, than by means of studying 
only what the ‘voids’ are.   
We proceed by first discussing relevant literature in Section 2, suggesting a conceptual 
framework. Section 3 elaborates on method and data, which are analyzed in terms of the framework 
presented in Section 4. We discuss our findings and provide conclusions in the final section (5). 
 
2 Literature 
Institutions are society’s devised rules, norms, values, or agreements that constrain certain behaviors 
in order to stimulate others (North 1990; 1991). Alternatively, and more comprehensively, Hodgson 
(2006) defines institutions as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social 
interaction. Institutions give stability and predictability to the behaviors of individuals in a particular 
practice (Neale 1987), but are also indispensable to understand change (Dolfsma & Verburg 2008; 
Dolfsma et al. 2011). A social practice, at any aggregation level, country, industry, market, or 
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organization, will be affected by a number of different institutions (North 1990; Stein, 1994; 1991; 
Mair and Marti 2009; Sutter et al. 2013).  
Some claim that a lack of economic development and entrepreneurial failure is due to 
missing formal institutions, creating an institutional void (Khanna and Palepu 1997, 2000; Mair and 
Marti 2009; Castellacci, 2015). In reality, however, institutional fabrics are complex and rich in 
character, even when (some) formal institutions that regulate a practice elsewhere are lacking in a 
country under study. Not recognizing this deprives one of an explanation of complexities and “on-
the-ground dynamics” (Mair et al. 2012: 819) in a practice. What expectations of success players in a 
market have depends on the institutions they are facing.  
 
2.1 The institutional fabric (facing entrepreneurs): 4 types of institutions 
To analyze the institutions entrepreneurs are confronted with, and moreover competition between 
contradicting or conflicting institutions, we propose to distinguish between four types of 
(interrelated) institutions. Conceptually, our framework is aligned to Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006) 
notion of competing or conflicting institutions, i.e. interactions between institutions that may cause 
dysfunctionality. In order to study such interrelations it is beneficial to first identify the relevant 
institutional dimensions that allow identification of fabrics of interrelated institutions in which, as we 
argue below, a swamp can develop.  
The first dimension that is relevant in our context is the differentiation between formal and 
informal institutions (Casson, Giusta and Kambhampati, 2010; Steer and Sen, 2010). Formal 
institutions comprise societies’ “constitutions, laws, [and] property rights” (North 1991: 97). Formal 
institutions are codified, written down, and enforced by State bodies. Within countries formal 
institutions generally apply in the whole country and are equal for all the citizens. Informal 
institutions concern societies’ “sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct”, (North 
1991: 97) and “religious beliefs” (Mair et al. 2012: 820). Informal institutions may differ between 
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countries, groups and even individual actors. Informal and formal institutions can have a variety of 
interrelations enhancing effectiveness (e.g. formal and informal institutions being complements and 
increasing their joint effectiveness, or informal institutions substituting non-functional formal 
institutions) or the opposite (e.g. formal and informal institutions competing with each other or 
being in an accommodating interrelationship) (cf. Helmke and Levitsky 2004). That formal institutions 
do have an impact on entrepreneurship is realized widely among scholars, but informal institutions 
can also have a significant impact on the commercial chance of entrepreneurs (Dolfsma & De Lanoy 
2016). 
Next to this differentiation, we argue that a second dimension is of crucial importance to 
understand the context in which institutional swamps may emerge, since competing and 
contradicting institutions may not only occur between formal and informal institutions but also 
among formal and among informal institutions themselves. In addition, while markets are a universal 
institution of exchange, institutions regulating behaviors of actors in markets are not only based on 
general grounds of market exchange (Rawls 1995). Market exchange is embedded in a wider space of 
social exchange (Dolfsma et al. 2005). Market exchange also depends on institutions that do not 
primarily address market exchange, or are not intended or believed to do so. In other words, there 
are institutions directly targeting the practice of market exchange, while other institutions target 
other practices that may indirectly still affect markets. Therefore, we distinguish between institutions 
– formal as well as informal –  that directly target the market and those that influence behaviors and 
outcomes indirectly. Direct institutions are best described with existing definitions of economic 
institutions “that define the production, allocation and distribution process of goods and services” 
(Jütting 2003: 14), comprising property rights, market mechanisms, contracts, money, and 
technology. Indirect institutions are those that do not primarily aim to influence production and 
allocation – but may indirectly do so (Rawls 1955). Such indirect institutions are closest to the 
concept of nonmarket forces comprising “social, political and legal arrangements that structure […] 
interactions outside of, and in conjunction with, markets” (Baron 1995: 48). 
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Conceptually then, we can derive four types of institutions (see Figure 1): 
1. Direct formal institutions 
2. Direct informal institutions 
3. Indirect formal institutions 
4. Indirect informal institutions 
To make the abstract logic above more clear, consider the examples below that we derived from 
literature. Firstly, concerning direct formal institutions, the before-mentioned contract-law 
enforcement, protection of property rights, as well as established capital markets, and other 
supporting apparatuses serve as examples (North 1990; 1991; Mair and Marti 2009; Sutter et al. 
2013). Secondly, an example of direct informal institutions may concern the status of an 
entrepreneur (Dolfsma & De Lanoy 2016). While in Western societies entrepreneurs may enjoy 
status, scholars found that in communist regimes and transition economies there were negative 
connotations to the term private enterprise or entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs may lack status and 
respect (De Clercq, Danis, and Dakhli 2010). According to Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2008: 658) 
entrepreneurs in the Soviet Union were “equated with ‘speculators’ and often deemed criminals for 
making a profit”. Another example includes the acceptance of interest payment. Islamic banks do not 
permit contracts in which interests are paid or received (Ergeç and Arslan 2013), even if this is 
formally allowed. Furthermore, a recent study found that ethnicity plays an important role in 
selecting business partners (Hegde and Tumlinson 2014). Thirdly, concerning indirect formal 
institutions, one may think of a society’s political system. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model how 
political institutions (“including dictatorships, absolute monarchies, oligarchies, and corrupt or even 
populist democracies”(p. 325)) affect economic institutions and outcomes. Furthermore, one may 
think of the ways in which marriage law and inheritance law (cf. Carney, Gedajlovic, and Strike 2014), 
or environmental regulations, may affect entrepreneurial behavior. Concerning the latter, Dean, 
Lovely, and Wang (2009) found that a country’s regulation concerning pollution is, under certain 
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conditions, one of the factors affecting foreign direct investment decisions. Fourthly, and finally, 
indirect informal institutions include examples of culture in general. Hawkins (1993) contrasts the 
individual character of entrepreneurship to the group (collective) orientation of Japanese culture. 
Individual acts of entrepreneurship go against accepted wisdom and are not valued in society. In 
other societies there are clear gender roles that prevent women from participating on the market. 
“Many societies continue to define women primarily through roles associated with family and 
household responsibilities. […] Further, the entrepreneur’s role is often characterized as being more 
masculine than feminine” (Baughn, Chua, and Neupert. 2006: 689). Bernard, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 
(2010) argue that conservatism in African societies may prevent entrepreneurship. A major obstacle 
is that individual success is attributed to luck and not to effort. Since success is a consequence of 
luck, successful people are expected to share their success in the community. In addition if one is 
repeatedly more successful than others he or she can be thought to manipulate supernatural forces. 
Incentives to work hard are consequently reduced. 
The figure below illustrates the four types of institutions in four different quadrants and 
where the above-mentioned examples fit. We refer to this figure as the institutional fabric. Although 
we use an idealized categorical distinction of institutions it is sometimes difficult to precisely 
delineate formal from informal or a direct from an indirect institution (cf. Helmke and Levitsky 2006). 
Indeed, we argue that the degree of formality or directedness should be rather understood as a 
continuum, while categorical representation eases clear representation. 
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Figure 1 - Institutional fabric facing entrepreneurs 
   Direct Effect      Indirect Effect 
 
Formal Institutions  
 
 
Informal Institutions 
 
 
2.2 Tensions between institutions: institutional swamp 
The four types of institutions form the institutional fabric, a fabric that can be complex  (Mair et al. 
2012). We argue that this complexity results in large part from inconsistencies, conflict, or tensions 
between institutions (Dolfsma & Verburg 2008). The concept of tensions forms a central part of the 
framework. We refer to a tension when actors in a certain practice are confronted with two or more 
institutions prescribing different kinds of behavior that cannot coexist. In such a situation the actor 
will try to accommodate the tension by adhering more or less to a certain institution, while avoiding, 
and possibly ignoring, another institution (see also Dolfsma & Verburg 2008; Neale 1987; Oliver 
1991).  
Tensions may exist between institutions within a cell in Figure 1 but also between institutions 
from different cells. For example, some formal direct institutions may stimulate market exchange 
while other institutions may result in high start-up or labor costs and, therefore, compromise market 
exchange (De Clercq et al.2010; Hawkins 1993; Duvanova 2014; Estrin, Korosteleva, and Mickiewicz 
2013; Fredriksson 2014). The former institutions (laws) are benefiting some parties in the market, 
while the latter institutions are benefitting others (cf. Heller, 2008; Dolfsma & McMaster 2011). For 
the sake of simplicity, we do not elaborate on such intra-cell institutional tensions. Similarly, market 
exchange is generally based on institutions that make no gender differences, however, informal 
Contract laws 
Property rights 
Supporting apparatuses 
Etc… 
Marriage law 
Inheritance law 
Environmental regulations 
Etc… 
Status as entrepreneur 
Interest payment 
Preferred business partner 
Etc… 
Group culture 
Group roles 
Cultural beliefs 
Etc… 
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institutions may create tensions if gender issues, as indicated above, influence the market behavior 
of men and women differently.  
We use the metaphor of a swamp since differences in prescribed behavior may make 
entrepreneurs be bogged down when they are not able to align the tensions. This is not to say that it 
is simply a matter of choice to the entrepreneurs whether or not they drown. It is merely to say that 
institutions may vary and so may behavior and behavioral outcomes. What behavior to choose, what 
institution to adhere to, may not necessarily be obvious to individuals, hence the tension. We stress 
that the concept of tension not only involves conflicting institutions prescribing different kinds of 
behavior that cannot coexist, but also includes the actual behavior. Institutions are ontologically 
different from behavior and the one cannot be reduced to the other (Dolfsma and Verburg 2008). 
 
2.3 Tensions between institutions: institutional entrepreneurship 
Individual entrepreneurs are embedded in an institutional context but their behavior may also 
change this context (Seo and Creed 2002). Several studies analyze institutional change processes and 
focus on the role of institutional entrepreneurs (Di Maggio 1988; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 
2002; Dorado, 2005; Mair, Mayer, Lutz, 2015). Institutional entrepreneurs are actors who have an 
interest in modifying institutional fabrics and have sufficient tangible and intangible resources to do 
so (DiMaggio 1988), either for all involved in a practice or to some.  
Following the example on gender roles above, a woman in a certain society may choose not 
to become an entrepreneur because of informal institutions, she may decide to become an 
entrepreneur because law allows her to do so despite informal resistance, or she might invite others 
to front as entrepreneur for her and share the value created. Whichever behavior she chooses, in 
both cases she simultaneously adheres to certain institutions while avoiding yet possibly defying 
others (see also Oliver 1991). Some market-related behaviors, or market-related behaviors by some 
may conflict with formal or informal institutions in the society that do impact on market-related 
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behavior, directly or indirectly. As a consequence of choices made by entrepreneurs, institutions and 
institutional fabrics may evolve. Continuing the example, this means that if women on a sufficiently 
large scale decide to start their own business, informal institutions that previously prevented them 
from doing so may change. 
We follow Battilana, Leca, and Boxenbaum (2009: 72) in defining institutional entrepreneurs 
as “agents who initiate, and actively participate in the implementation of, changes that diverge from 
existing institutions, independent of whether the initial intent was to change the institutional 
environment and whether the changes were successfully implemented”. Although we acknowledge 
that contradicting institutions may drown institutional entrepreneurs in the swamp it is also possible, 
in some circumstances and for some actors, that institutional entrepreneurs are able to change the 
institutional context and thereby sometimes actually benefit from the existing institutional tensions. 
It is even possible to see the tensions as a prerequisite or an enabling condition for institutional 
entrepreneurship (Seo and Creed 2002). From this we derive two important observations.  First, 
tensions are not necessarily counterproductive as they may provide room to some for institutional 
entrepreneurship. Second, the institutional environment is not fixed for individual entrepreneurial 
actors but can be moderated through their actions, at least at times. In particular in young markets 
where the institutional environment is weakly developed or enforced, individual entrepreneurial 
action may affect the institutional context. Not enough is known about what allows institutional 
entrepreneurial actors to make institutions change.    
We develop this framework of types of institutions each impinging on a practice, resulting 
institutional tensions, and a possible role for institutional entrepreneurial actors with case study data 
about farmer-entrepreneurs producing sesame in Ethiopia. 
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3 Methodology 
A case study research design is the most appropriate for this study, since in-depth, socially-complex, 
multi-level data is required for this study (Yin 2004). Because of the demanding circumstances in the 
environment the study focused on, multiple sources of information have to be consulted. One goal of 
consulting a number of different sources of information is to exclude possible alternative 
explanations for the phenomenon investigated different from the one suggested (Yin 2003). We have 
undertaken several rounds of data gathering, each time discussing with country and sector experts if 
the data we had gathered had to be supplemented by data from different sources. Consistency of 
insights generated, compared with insights the project had offered up to a particular point and 
compared with what the experts consulted were knowledgeable about, in particular would trigger a 
quest for additional data in a subsequent round of data gathering. The institutional setting for 
cooperatives and their members has not been studied. In advance, it was unclear what variables 
would be relevant to include as possible control variables.  
 Dependent on a careful selection of the case or cases for a study, guided by considerations 
arising from the theory used and developed, case study research allows for generalization (e.g. 
Giddens 1984).  Cases that are similar, from the point of view of the theory adopted, should be 
expected to show the same findings when the method to do research is adopted in the exact same 
manner. Provided that this is the case, theoretical generalization to other contexts is not just possible 
but can be validly pursued. Ethiopia is a developing country, and Humera is a province inside 
Ethiopia, in which a particular kind of entrepreneurial activity (sesame farming) has only recently 
emerged as physically feasible. Institutions affecting this activity are developing, with a relative 
absence of formal, market-related institutions. This is a setting that should show the institutional 
void that some scholars discuss at length. Rather, as we find and as OIE would suggest, a number of 
different kinds of institutions, potentially in conflict with each other, impinge on the practice of 
entrepreneurship, presenting to the entrepreneurs a situation that many perceive as what we refer 
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to as an institutional swamp. Entrepreneurs are curtailed in what they can feasibly do in their 
practice. 
We collected case study data among cooperatives of sesame seed farmers in the Northwest 
of Ethiopia. The emphasis in our data collection was on both the institutional environment and the 
behavior of cooperatives. Cooperatives are expected to play a crucial role in the further development 
of agricultural markets in developing countries (World Bank, 2007). Most, but not all, farmers are 
seriously resource constrained and collective action is seen as an important instrument to provide 
them access to lacking resources (Bernard et al., 2010). Collective action may allow them to develop 
the resources needed to accommodate the tensions and to develop institutional entrepreneurship 
(DiMaggio 1988, McKague et al., 2016).  Interestingly, in this region many cooperatives operate 
according to the same regulations, but have yet developed differently. Farmers can genuinely be 
conceived as entrepreneurs: individuals owning arable land can rent their land to others, taking a 
predetermined income and not accepting entrepreneurial risks for a deferred income. In addition, 
what resources farmer-entrepreneurs have differs between them and are actually being employed 
differently as well. 
 
3.1 Selection of the research site 
We were interested in collecting data in a developing country because institutional environments 
change quickly. In addition we wanted to be able to study how competing firms responded to 
institutional structures in this context.  Ethiopia is chosen because the country is characterized by a 
high need to create institutions. The Northwest provided the scenery of severe fights during wars 
between the former regime and liberation fronts (until 1991) and between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
(around the year 2000). Formal direct institutions have been changing quickly as a result of the 
regime change and the economy has been growing at a fast pace since the beginning of the twenty-
first century. In addition, sesame seed is a crop of major importance for the Ethiopian economy and 
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therefore highly susceptible to policy making. After coffee it is the second largest source of export 
revenues. In the case of sesame seed farmers, institutions concerning the Ethiopia Commodity 
Exchange and cooperative formation and management were designed and enforced. Production of 
sesame increased tenfold the past decade. Particularly in Northwest Ethiopia production increased 
rapidly and the quality of the sesame is considered to be high. After the war many farmers settled in 
the ‘low-land’ area Kafta-Humera that provides perfect conditions for cultivating the cash crop 
sesame: abandoned land is now used for the production of sesame. Increasingly farmers started 
cooperatives to benefit from sesame production and trade.  
 
3.2 Research process 
We collected secondary data on laws, proclamations, and principles concerning the formation of 
cooperatives and the trade in agricultural produce. Furthermore, a range of industry experts were 
interviewed in order to map the institutional environment. Once we came to understand the 
institutional environment we interviewed farmers and leaders of cooperatives to study how they 
respond to the institutional environment. In total 131 interviews were conducted during six visits to 
Ethiopia (see Appendix 1). Qualitative data collection and analysis techniques were used as 
suggested by Eisenhardt (1989; 1991) and Yin (2003). In the initial exploratory phase of our data 
collection we studied 9 cooperatives as potential cases in our study. Below, we give more detail how 
we decided to include  4 of the 9 cooperatives  as exemplary cases to be included for further study. 
These cases allow us to draw out our findings while avoiding too much data in our article. The 4 cases 
each demonstrated distinguishing characteristics that the other 5 cases all exemplified as well 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Langley 1999) - most cooperatives behaved in similar ways as the 
cooperative Adebay. Adebay therefore represents the majority of cooperatives. The other 
cooperatives, Humera 1, Humera 2, and Maikadra, are included because their behaviors differed 
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despite the same institutional environment. These last three cases demonstrate how entrepreneurs 
can respond to tensions and how it affects performance.  
In total we conducted 131 interviews. A complete break-down of interviewees is given in the 
Appendix. The interviews served different purposes. The large number of interviews was 
necessitated by the fact that, though secondary data about the sesame sector in Ethiopia is available, 
it is limited and of poor quality. In addition interviewing allowed for triangulation between primary 
and secondary data.  
All interviews were semi-structured, face-to-face, and started by asking about a number of 
questions of a factual nature. Farmers, for instance, were asked about their farming and trading 
activities, household composition as well as how many hectares they farmed and how much of that 
was used for sesame. In total 9 interviews with members of cooperatives were conducted and 7 with 
non-members.  A well-educated translator who was familiar with agricultural practices in the region 
was involved in the collection of primary data. Industry experts were interviewed in order to come to 
understand the sector and its institutional environment. Industry experts are defined as “highly 
knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives”  (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner 2007: 28). Industry experts included researchers from universities and research institutes, 
staff from various NGOs, aid workers, and consultants. Interviewing industry experts helped verify 
and complement data that we collected from interviews with farmers and cooperative 
representatives. Government staff at federal, regional (i.e. the region of Tigray) and local level (i.e. 
the county Kafta-Humera) was interviewed to come to understand their reasoning behind the 
development of policies, rules, and law and the way of enforcement. This was insightful, for example 
since there appeared to be differences of opinion between federal and regional level on how to 
enforce certain laws. Other firms in the value chain not involved in production of sesame itself, ECX 
staff and spot market traders were interviewed to map the value chain, to study the farmers’ 
positions in the value chain and to understand trade and supply conditions. These interviews 
17 
 
revealed different outlets options available to farmers and cooperatives, and the conditions and 
advantages attached to each of them. Mapping the value chain allows for identifying entrepreneurial 
opportunities farmers can pursue, either individually or as a collective (i.e. at cooperative level). 
Large-scale farmers may have access to resources comparable to resources accessed by small-scale 
farmers  who organize into a cooperative, but have a different governance structure and could 
therefore make decisions differently. Finally, leaders of cooperatives and farmers (both members of 
cooperatives and non-members) were interviewed. The interviews with senior managers of 
cooperatives (18 interviews in total) helped us understanding how entrepreneurial decisions are 
made at cooperative level.  
This study is part of a larger research project focusing on other but related topics. We used 
the farm-level data collected by means of a survey among 369 farmers, 198 of whom were members 
of cooperatives, after conducting a pilot study involving 12 farmers, 7 of whom were members of 
cooperatives (Olthaar 2015). We compared members of cooperatives to non-members in terms of 
their performance. In addition, to the extent that comparison is possible using this survey data, we 
found that institutional circumstances did not differ between members and non-members of 
cooperatives. Authors will provide this additional information upon request.  
 
4 Findings 
In this section, we first present and discuss institutions that farmer-entrepreneurs in the Kafta-
Humera region of Ethiopia face, by category distinguished. Subsequently we show and analyze how 
institutions can conflict to create an institutional swamp for all but some entrepreneurs. The 
discussion in Section 4.1 gives the background for Section 4.2, which provides the argument about 
why entrepreneurs in this context mostly find themselves in an institutional swamp, while some are 
able to navigate the tensions successfully. 
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4.1 Four Types of Institutions 
Direct formal institutions. Almost all sesame in Ethiopia is exported as raw, unprocessed sesame. 
Exporting firms are by law obliged to buy their sesame via the Ethiopia Commodity exchange (ECX). 
The ECX is an auction organizing wholesale transactions between buyers and sellers of several 
commodities. There are two exceptions to this rule: if cooperatives, their Union or Federation, export 
they can bypass the ECX and exporting firms that assume processing activities are allowed to engage 
in contract farming schemes with primary cooperatives. 
According to direct formal institutions sesame seed farmers in Kafta Humera have three sales 
outlets to choose from: 1) the cooperative, 2) the spot market trader, and 3) exporters via the ECX. 
Currently most farmers sell to a spot market trader, while the remaining group of farmers sells to a 
cooperative. Small-scale farmers do not sell via the ECX for two major reasons. Firstly, to sell via the 
ECX a license is required, which is too expensive for individual small-scale farmers. Secondly, a 
minimum of 50 quintals2 has to be delivered. Small-scale farmers are not capable of delivering such 
quantities individually. 
Cooperatives have not been in existence for long, as the former regime fell only in 1991.  In 
1997 the first new cooperatives started to emerge, but the civil war of 2000 interfered. Membership 
bases are now growing gradually, mostly due to increased recognition of the potential of collective 
action. According to law, cooperatives are organized at three levels: the region, the county (woreda), 
and the village (kebele). At kebele-level farmers are supposed to organize in so-called primary 
cooperatives. The primary cooperatives are expected to unite in a Union at the level of the woreda. 
The major role of the Union in this model, or the second-level cooperative, is to sell the farmers’ 
produce in large quantities, for example for exporting. The idea is that at the level of the Union 
required exporting capabilities can be developed such as language skills, legal skills, quality control, 
                                                          
2 The local measuring standard of 1 quintal is 100 kilogram 
19 
 
and quantity accumulation. In the region under study, Tigray, there is even a third-level cooperative 
called a Federation. Its distinctive functions are unclear as it assumes similar roles as the Union, 
albeit with a more diverse range of products and a larger scale. Primary cooperatives are by law 
allowed to export (supposed that they have the required resources), to sell to the Union, or to sell to 
exporters via the ECX. Similarly, the Union can export directly, sell to the Federation, or to exporting 
firms via the ECX. 
Law further provides formal rules regarding the operations of cooperatives and prescribes 
that any group of farmers can start a cooperative in a kebele as long as the purpose of the 
cooperative differs from existing cooperatives. Members of a cooperative can determine the share 
price of the cooperative, though cooperatives should exist of at least 10 members and no member is 
allowed to have more than 10% of the shares. The law furthermore states that of the profit made 
30% has to be put in a “reserve fund” (although it is unclear what a reserve fund is), while 70% has to 
be distributed to members in the form of dividend. One member has one vote. Members can elect a 
leader for a period of three years which can be extended by one more period of three years. Only 
citizens of the village in which the cooperative is located are allowed to become member, although in 
case of shortage of money a cooperative may accept members from another village.  
A majority of farmers, however, chooses to sell their produce to spot market traders. Spot 
market traders bulk the produce of farmers and sell the sesame via the ECX. Traders are interesting 
for farmers as cooperatives are not operational permanently in all the kebeles. Moreover, traders 
pay cash, accept different qualities, buy frequently, and may even provide credit. Apparently these 
advantages more than balance the alleged disadvantages concerning a weak bargaining position for 
farmers, the risk of cheating and relatively low prices.     
Direct informal institutions. In addition to institutions that are directly targeting sesame production 
and trade and are formally written down and enforced, there is a set of institutions that directly 
targets sesame production and trade, but are not formally codified. Remarkably it is government 
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staff that ignores the formal institutions and intervenes to enforce informal ones. The government 
does so because it fears that without intervening the formal institutions cause farmers to be 
excluded from market participation and cooperative membership. Much of the staff (though not all 
of them) envisions a market in which every farmer can participate, preferably in one collective. The 
idea is that all-inclusiveness (including all farmers in one cooperative) will benefit the farmers (World 
Bank 2007). As a result of this, staff from both federal and regional governments enforce certain 
informal institutions. A first institution is that, though formally allowed, government staff does not 
permit farmers to establish more than one cooperative per village. Government staff interferes in the 
formation of cooperatives and ensures that only so-called ‘multi-purpose cooperatives’ are formed 
with the effect that no other cooperative with a unique purpose can be formed anymore. To the 
Ethiopian government, cooperatives also are a means of controlling communities, and of suppressing 
politically unwelcome voices. Long sessions are conducted to ensure that the members of a 
cooperative democratically ‘vote’ to adopt a policy that the government favors for political reasons. 
Moreover, the government prevents direct export by primary cooperatives, even if they have 
capabilities to do so. Cooperatives are instructed that it requires a Union to benefit from export 
sales. Direct export by a cooperative would give such a cooperative additional resources and would 
make it more difficult for the government to tax. 
The situation on the ground is even more confusing as staff from the regional government of 
Tigray set up a Federation, a third-level cooperative, and uses its political powers to ensure that 
primary cooperatives supply sesame to the Federation rather than to the Union. It did so by engaging 
in long and repetitive meetings with leaders of cooperatives and by enforcing a new regulation that 
allowed primary cooperatives only to sell to the Union if they were able to proof the descent of their 
members. The latter is close to impossible in a region with a weak administration and so much 
illiteracy as in Kafta-Humera. The meetings functioned furthermore to “convince” the leaders of 
cooperatives to buy fertilizer from the state-owned monopolist. Cooperatives are also pressured to 
keep the share price low to keep the cooperative accessible for new members and to provide 
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benefits to the wider community, including non-members. Another salient aspect of the informal 
design is that leaders are supposed to receive a salary for every day worked independent of how 
much profit a cooperative makes. 
Staff of the Regional Cooperative Agency (RCA) of Tigray explained that these meetings are 
“a type of democratic approach. You cannot simply impose cooperatives and members to do 
something, but they need to be convinced of what they need to do by giving understanding.” They 
furthermore explained that because “Ethiopia is a developing country the government functions to 
explain to leaders of cooperatives what the best thing is to do”. 
At the level of the individual farmer there are also other important non-governmental 
informal direct institutions regulating, for example, the provision of loans by spot market traders to 
farmers. Farmers engage in high pre-selling costs due to the need to rent a tractor for plowing, hire 
laborers for weeding and harvesting, buying bags for sesame, and other costs. Cooperatives often 
cannot provide such loans due to free riding of members in the past. As a consequence, cooperatives 
were defaulting on their loans provided by banks and government which are therefore currently 
unwilling to provide loans to the cooperatives. Access to loans from spot market traders is therefore 
highly attractive to farmers. 
 
Indirect formal institutions. The number of indirect institutions relevant to sesame trade is smaller 
than the institutions mentioned so far. However, a very important one concerns access to land. All 
land is State-owned, but land can be leased from the State. Where most civilians can apply for the 
lease of two hectares, certain former fighters as a kind of retirement scheme received 10 hectares of 
land and 5,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) after the war. Some former fighters use this advantage to invest 
in sesame farming. The land distribution is also affected by inheritance laws. While land is leased for 
a certain period of time from the State, entitlements to land use can be inherited by children. A 
problem, however, is that when a farmer has two hectares and a number of children, the land is 
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split-up and may become too small to make investments for cash crops in addition to food crops 
used for home consumption. A final formal, though indirect, institution concerns neighboring country 
Eritrea – which used to be part of Ethiopia – being an official enemy with which Ethiopia is still at war 
(though there is hardly any fighting). Kafta-Humera borders Eritrea. Farmers are constrained by the 
war because it formally prevents cross-border trade. 
Indirect informal institutions. Finally, concerning indirect informal institutions, perceived gender roles 
still determine leadership of cooperatives. People in rural Ethiopia do not accept female authority or 
leadership by a young person. This means that leaders are not elected based on competencies, but 
on gender and age instead. Though institutions on authority are not directly designed to address 
markets or firms, they do affect markets as well. Similarly, religion plays an important role. 
Recurrently farmers responded in interviews that only God can provide good harvests and that there 
is not much they can do themselves. This answer was also given on questions regarding opportunities 
for irrigation, use of chemicals, and farmer organization. In other words, religious institutions 
prescribe that God is controlling everything and that there is little that man can do to be successful. 
Finally, throughout the country soldiers that participated in liberating the country from the former 
regime enjoy much respect and status. This status is sometimes accompanied with certain privileges 
that may also affect markets. 
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Figure 2 - Institutional fabric for farmers and cooperatives producing sesame in Ethiopia’s  
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4.2 Institutional tensions and entrepreneurial behavior 
Figure 2 above empirically summarizes the institutional fabric that guides action of farmers and 
cooperatives as discussed above. Of particular theoretical interest are the resulting tensions and 
impact of these on entrepreneurial behaviors. After all, tensions and resulting entrepreneurial 
behaviors can make the institutional environment an institutional swamp to entrepreneurs. Drawing 
on the previous in Section 4.1, we discuss a number of tensions that entrepreneurs face. The point of 
departure is the view expressed in parts of the literature that the entrepreneurial practice is 
regulated by formal institutions that directly impinge on it. If these are not present, an institutional 
void is said to exist by some observers. This section makes the argument that the three other types 
of institutions also impinge on entrepreneurial activity, creating potential tensions of three kinds. 
Figure 3 indicates this situation. We discuss in this section in particular the possibilities that some 
actors have taken to seek to change the institutional environment to their own advantage.  
Tensions of the first kind are present when formal institutions not primarily aimed at the 
focal practice of entrepreneurship by sesame seed farmers do affect this practice and lead to 
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behaviors that actors would not otherwise show. Tensions of the second kind are present when 
formal institutions regulating the sesame market are not in line with how entrepreneurs themselves 
would organize the practice. Tensions of the third kind are present when informal institutions not 
primarily aimed at the focal practice do affect this practice and leads to behaviors that actors would 
not otherwise show. Tensions of the fourth kind, finally, are present when informal institutions not 
primarily directed at the focal practice of entrepreneurship (by sesame seed farmers in Ethiopia) 
actually do affect this practice and lead to behaviors that conflict with behaviors prescribed by 
informal institutions directly aimed at the focal practice. 
 
Figure 3 - Institutional Tensions 
       Direct Effect         Indirect Effect 
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Most salient tensions in the case of sesame seed cooperatives in Ethiopia come from conflicting 
direct formal and direct informal institutions (tension 2), but other tensions are real too. At times, it 
may not be unequivocally clear what kind of tension is at play. Where formally each group of at least 
ten farmers is allowed to start a cooperative, this is prevented through informal institutions that 
prescribe that each village may have only one cooperative dealing with a specific agricultural activity 
(tension 2). As the establishment of multi-purpose cooperatives is encouraged to exert more political 
control over villagers, there is not much room left for other agricultural cooperatives, which comes at 
the cost of specialization (tension 2). All land is owned by the State. After the civil war and the war 
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with Eritrea formal laws were designed, based on egalitarian principles, to provide people the chance 
to get access to 2 hectares of land. However, former fighters received 10 hectares (tension 1). 
Economic reasons may pit against equally dividing land among farmers, yet these egalitarian 
principles were favored by the new regime after a long period of communist rule by the DERG regime 
(tension 1). At the same time, land or land rights cannot be sold. It can, however, be rented to others 
(tension 1). Leaders of cooperatives are formally allowed to determine the share price, but are 
informally pressured to keep the share price as low as 50 ETB (approximately 3 US Dollars; tension 2), 
such that the cooperative remains accessible to everyone. If everybody can become a member of a 
cooperative, the Ethiopian government is better able to exert influence over its citizens in this region. 
Cooperatives are furthermore formally allowed to determine how to reimburse the leaders and staff 
of the cooperative, but according to informal institutions the most preferred reimbursement is the 
‘per diem’ salary in which leaders are paid for each day they have worked (tension 2). In addition 
cooperatives formally can choose to sell to different buyers (ECX, Union, importer, spot market 
trader), but are informally pressured to sell to the Federation (tension 2, and 3 as the tension is 
political as well). Solidarity principles prescribe the cooperative to bring benefits to the community 
and not just to its members only (tension 2) –tractors that the cooperative has purchased to help 
harvest and transport produce cannot be made available to members only or first. In other words, 
the cooperative is expected to consider the goods it creates more as social or local public goods than 
as club goods. Cultural, informal indirect institutions further prescribe that authority is a masculine 
role for senior people, but ignore needed competences (tension 3). Religious beliefs may cause 
farmers to refrain from making entrepreneurial investments in cooperatives, such as investments in 
irrigation (tension 3). Finally, the status of former fighters gives them rights that go against the 
informal direct institution of all-inclusiveness. Contrary to other farmers, former fighters are 
‘permitted’ to form their own cooperative even if there is one already in a certain village (tension 4). 
These situations confront farmers and leaders of cooperatives with choices to make, exemplifying 
tensions of the kinds highlighted. Practices can differ slightly from one setting to the next, and actors 
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within them can behave more or less as an institutional entrepreneur. We discuss the 
entrepreneurial practice in 4 villages in the Humera region in Ethiopia, where the village-cooperative 
of Adebay is representative for the most common behavior and the 5 village-cooperatives not 
discussed, and the other three cooperatives (Humera 1,  Humera 2, and Maikadra) each show distinct 
features from the point of view of institutional entrepreneurial behavior. 
Adebay. The cooperative Adebay is almost drowning in the swamp. Concerning the tensions above it 
often chose for institutions prescribing non-entrepreneurial behavior. The share price was kept low 
despite the organization’s investments in a warehouse, office, and tractor. Leaders were paid per 
day, sitting in an office as much as possible rather than more directly for promoting the interests of 
the cooperative (tension 2). Leaders had little incentives to increase profits since this would not 
affect their salaries. The cooperative sold its supply to the Federation (tension 2 and 3), made its 
assets (such as the tractor) available on a first-come-first-served basis (tension 2), and elected 
leaders based on seniority and gender (tension 3). 
Several problems resulted that cause the cooperative to nearly drown. The elected, but 
incompetent, leader hardly enjoyed education and has little understanding of managing businesses. 
This makes him very susceptible to ‘advices’ from the RCA. We observed much dissatisfaction 
concerning the cooperative among both members and non-members. Members were about to lose 
their patience after not having received dividend for four to five consecutive years. Without dividend 
there is no price difference between what the cooperative pays to farmers and what spot market 
traders pay. Members started to lose their trust in the organization as they did not know what was 
done with the profits of the organization. The cooperative also did not have an accountant and was 
not transparent at all concerning revenues and costs. The leaders argued that the money was kept in 
the safe and that they were hoping for a government accountant to come (which had not come for 
over four years).  
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Aside from the lack of trust and incompetence of the leader, at the time, the cooperative 
could not trade in much sesame. The reason was that they were selling to the Federation. The 
Federation got into large financial problems and it took about four months before cooperatives 
received the money. In the meantime, cooperatives did not have money to finance other 
transactions. Cooperatives are not considered trustworthy lenders by banks and government, so 
borrowing money is not an option. The cash flow problems resulting from selling to the Federation 
limited the amount of sesame the cooperative could buy. The cooperative furthermore allowed new 
farmers to become member of the cooperative for only 50 ETB (tension 2). Though willingness to 
become member was low among non-members, the regulations also resulted in little willingness to 
invest among existing members (tension 2). In the past the cooperative used profits partially to buy 
equipment or to construct a warehouse. Non-members are given equal access to these assets as 
members, even though members forfeited the dividend the cooperative would have been able to pay 
had it not invested in these assets (tension 2). In the last interview the leader said he would increase 
the share price to 100 ETB, but even if this is done, the share price would not reflect the value of the 
assets properly and, consequently, would not help to resolve the low willingness to invest.  
 
Humera 1. That it is possible to play the institutional environment differently than Adebay and all the 
cooperatives it represents, is illustrated by three other cooperatives, of which the first one is Humera 
1. The cooperative is fortunate to have a senior male leader who is educated and competent (tension 
3). The leader of Humera 1 understood that for the cooperative to succeed it is vital to create trust 
among the members and willingness to invest. He therefore employed a certified accountant and 
created transparency by communicating clearly all the money streams. He decided not to have a per 
diem salary, but a commission based salary with which he would receive 2% of the profits made as 
reimbursement. As such he created an incentive to make as much profit as possible (tension 2). He 
wanted to engage in continuous buying and selling transactions, such that the limited cash available 
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at the organization would realize a high turnover. This ambition was partially frustrated when he did 
not get paid quickly for the sesame he had sold to the Federation. This delayed payment made him 
threaten the Federation with a law suit. The threat alone was sufficient for the Federation to pay him 
quickly. The reason is that Humera 1 is one of the few cooperatives with an ECX license. The 
Federation is an initiative of the regional government, while the ECX is one originating from the 
federal government. The federal government has high stakes in making the ECX succeed and prefers 
cooperatives to sell via the ECX rather than to the regional Federation. The Tigray Federation feared 
its chances of success in a law suit at federal level. For a cooperative, selling via the ECX is interesting 
because buyers deposit money at the ECX prior to bidding and, therefore, sellers receive the money 
guaranteed within two days after sales (tension 2). 
The leader of Humera 1 furthermore increased the share price to 400 ETB such that the share 
price would more closely reflect the organization’s value (contrary to what was informally  preferred 
by the RCA – tension 2). From the data we learn that members are highly positive about the 
organization, new farmers were joining, and revenues and profits have been increasing for a number 
of years. In addition it paid dividends to its members. 
We must stress that the actions taken by the leader of the cooperative are not simple 
choices. The pressures to conform to (in)formal institutions, including those indirectly affecting the 
entrepreneurship practice are high. Staff of the RCA, for example, told us in an interview that they 
did not like this commission-based salary and high share prices, and that they would take steps to 
inform the cooperative that these practices are not desirable. We do not know what steps the RCA 
effectively took, but up to the last interview the leader was sticking to his commission-based salary 
and share price. The pressures of the RCA, however, do make up the tension and make it less obvious 
for a leader what kind of reimbursement scheme to choose. 
 
29 
 
Maikadra. The third cooperative, Maikadra, is not drowning in the swamp, most importantly due to a 
processing firm interested in buying sesame directly from the cooperative (tension 2). The processing 
firm is organic certified and needs produce from certified farmers. However, at the ECX there is no 
grade or standard for organic produce. Sesame is bulked based on other criteria, making it impossible 
to buy organic produce via the ECX. The processing firm lobbied for over a year in order to be 
permitted to source sesame directly from Maikadra. As a result of this the law recently changed and 
nowadays processing firms are allowed to source directly from cooperatives, thereby bypassing the 
ECX. The government changed the law because it acknowledged the importance that more value-
adding activities take place within its borders. The benefit for Maikadra is that in addition to a new 
sales outlet, it also gained access to organic fertilizer that the state-owned monopolist could not 
supply and loans provided by the processing firm.  
The challenge for Maikadra is currently to remain supplier of the processing firm. They do 
make investments in warehouses and trucks, and only organic certified members can make use of it 
(tension 2), but the share price is still kept low despite these investments (tension 2). The access to 
loans (sesame farming requires high pre-selling costs), and organic fertilizer may be sufficient reason 
for members to participate actively in the cooperative and new members to join, but more potential 
can be realized.  
 
Humera 2. The name of this cooperative, Humera 2, already hints at a first tension that is challenged 
by its founders. Humera is the name of a village. According to informal institutions only one 
cooperative per village is permitted. The founders of Humera 2 found a way to play tension 1 and 
started their own cooperative with their own governance style, refusing new members, but enjoying 
high profits (tension 2). Humera 2 is an organization quite distinct from all the other cooperatives 
because it was not institutionalized according to the recommended blueprint. Humera 2 was 
founded in the year 2002 by 18 former fighters for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Their 
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status provided them some extra freedom in playing the institutional environment (tension 4). The 
cooperative engaged in all kinds of activities including sesame farming and trade Their activities were 
diverse and the members were capable of engaging in diverse activities since they received 10 
hectares of land after the war and 5,000 ETB (tension 1). Humera 2 formulated clear governance 
regulations. Its starting share price was 3,000 ETB, which is much higher than the conventional 50 
ETB that other cooperatives charge. The members formulated strict agreements concerning 
commitment and tasks were distributed according to competencies. Profits would be invested 
immediately in new business activities and salaries would be equal for all members. If a member 
does not participate actively he is sanctioned by means of not receiving a salary. No new members 
are allowed unless they know the potential member well (tension 2). Recently they set the share 
price to 50,000 ETB. When data collection approached the end, Humera 2 even changed its legal 
status from a cooperative to a limited liability company. 
 
4.3 Summary 
Above we discussed different tensions. The tensions confront the leaders of the cooperatives with 
choices to make. These choices affect their success. Most cooperatives, as represented by Adebay, 
face major problems and hardly survive. In other words, they are almost drowning in the swamp. 
Humera 1, Maikadra, and Humera 2 found ways to play the institutional environment and turn the 
tensions into opportunities to gain advantages. They used different mechanisms to do so. For the 
sesame seed cooperatives in our study most tensions resulted from contradicting and conflicting 
direct formal and direct informal institutions.  
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
No societal sphere, including a market, is an institutional void – even when no formal institutions 
directly seek to regulate actors’ behavior in one sphere, informal institutions and formal institutions 
from another sphere will (Rawls 1955). Rather than an institutional void, a plethora of possibly 
conflicting institutions, creating what we call here an “institutional swamp” can hamper 
entrepreneurs. Institutional fabrics are complex we argue, and show that tensions that confront 
entrepreneurs arise. Attributing a lack of entrepreneurial behavior to the absence of direct formal 
institutions (or their enforcement), to ‘voids’, may be misleading. Voids ignore the “on the ground 
dynamics” (Mair et al. 2012: 819), and the interactions between institutions. We propose a 
framework to understand these dynamics, allowing for a better sense of what affects entrepreneurs.  
In remote, barren Humera, a region in Ethiopia where few formal institutions exist in direct 
support of entrepreneurship and market exchange, informal institutions and formal institutions from 
others spheres impinge. From such other spheres, an important example is the principle of solidarity 
that conditions the market and the informal blueprint that local government staff recommends. A 
consequence is that each municipality is officiously only permitted to have one cooperative. In 
addition, partly informally, no farmer can be excluded from a collective, despite resulting free-riding 
problems.   
When some institutions – formal or informal, directly aimed at a sphere or not – prescribe 
one kind of behavior, and other institutions prescribe different, conflicting behaviors, ambiguity and 
tensions arise. Some actors are able to play the environment and act more entrepreneurially, while 
others are paralyzed and risk ‘drowning in the institutional swamp.’ Institutional entrepreneurs make 
choices that avoid the tensions that arise from conflicting institutional prescriptions for behavior. 
Institutional contexts do allow for agency. Institutional entrepreneurs do not simply ignore 
institutions that prevent them from adopting preferred behaviors in pursuit of their goals. Rather, 
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they can reach their goals by adopting behaviors that are, for instance, ostensibly in line with 
institutions that could be seen to hamper reaching a goal. Humera 1, for instance, is strongly focused 
on market transactions and the pursuit of profits, in apparent contrast with principles of solidarity, 
but can do so as it also invests in the community. In addition, it can resist regional government 
pressures to supply the Federation by drawing on its cognitive and financial resources and 
threatening with a law suit. These actions are legitimate, but only successful if properly played.  
Cooperative  leaders should have resources, but should in particular be seen as legitimately 
behaving themselves (cf. Oliver 1991). Members of Humera 2 have a strong reputation having served 
for a long time as officers in the army against the former regime. If the leader of a cooperative is 
chosen because of seniority, rather than merit, however, chances that he can effectively act as an 
institutional entrepreneur avoiding an institutional swamp may be lower. 
The room for some to play the institutional environment, but also the difficulty for many to 
do so, has hardly been recognized in studies on institutional environments and entrepreneurship in 
developing countries. Recognizing this room is of importance to current literature as it maps the 
space in which (institutional) entrepreneurs can maneuver, avoid drowning in an institutional 
swamp, and be successful. Humera 1, Humera 2, and Maikadra mostly adhered to market 
institutions, each in their own way, while the other cooperatives, represented by Adebay, mostly 
adhered to institutions far less friendly to market exchange. As a consequence, the prime goal of 
having a cooperative, seeking scale economies to strengthen the position in the market, cannot be 
reached. 
The framework we propose allows one to understand the ‘on the ground dynamics’ in a 
sphere in society. Informal institutions and formal institutions, direct, or indirect, can prescribe 
behaviors. The behaviors prescribed can conflict, causing tensions in a sphere, and giving rise to what 
we call an institutional swamp.  Institutional entrepreneurs, skilled and possessing legitimate 
resources that they employ in a way that is seen as legitimate, can resolve some of the conflicts and 
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indicate worthwhile solutions for further economic development. Successful cooperatives that play 
the institutional environment can become inspiring benchmarks for others. 
In conclusion we argue that not only unrealized potential of entrepreneurial activity in 
developing countries can be attributed to institutional environments, but so can realized potential. 
The crux is not just to study what is absent, the voids, but more so what is present. The richness of 
societies’ institutional fabrics explains to a greater extent entrepreneurial activity than do so-called 
voids. Mair et al. (2012) already made this argument, but to date no framework for studying 
institutional fabrics has been developed or used in the literature. We argue that the framework that 
we propose in the current article, as well as the conceptualization of the institutional swamp, 
increases the rigor of studies on institutional environments and entrepreneurial activity in developing 
countries. 
 
5.1 Managerial and policy implications 
Perceiving a societal sphere as an institutional void in case there are no or few formal institutions 
that directly prescribe behaviors in it, naively ignores the fact that informal institutions, as well as 
formal institutions that are primarily focused on a different sphere, do impinge on it too (cf. North 
1990). Ignoring that will give rise to the naive policy suggestion to import formal institutions that 
elsewhere regulate such a sphere. For policy makers an important implication is to find the balance 
in institutional fabrics that satisfies the principles that a society values, yet reduces ambiguity. In 
other words, institutions targeting the practice of market exchange need to be aligned with 
institutions targeting other values, preferably in such a way that society’s values are hardly 
compromised. Furthermore the importance of legitimacy is important to recognize. Top-down 
designed and installed institutions may not bear legitimacy in society and evoke acts of defiance, 
avoidance, resistance or other acts of agency (see Oliver 1991). Moreover, policy makers should 
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facilitate institutional entrepreneurs as they may be helpful in finding the proper balance and in 
creating more effective institutions.   
For cooperatives and involved NGOs an important implication from our study is to detect the 
room for maneuvering, the room existent in institutional fabrics to play the environment. Particularly 
in the context of ambiguity varied acts of behavior may be possible. In other words, institutional 
entrepreneurship can be a source of competitive advantage in such settings. Similarly, NGOs 
supporting firms in developing countries can benefit from recognizing the complexities of 
institutional fabrics, and to exploit tensions in the benefit of supported firms.  
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Appendix 
We conducted the following number interviews: 
Cooperatives (leaders and staff): 
Humera 1 :     3 
Humera 2:     2 
Maikadra:    3 
Adebay:    3 
Central:    1 
Aydola:     1 
Bereket:    2 
Baekar:     2 
Tirkan:     1 
Other farmer organizations: 
Large-scale farmers’ cooperative: 1 
Sesame farmers’ union Humera 3 
Sesame farmers’ union Sanja  2 
Oromiya Coffee Union   2 
Federation:    3 
Farmers: 
Members of cooperatives:  9 
Non-members:    7 
Large-scale farmers:   11 
Other: 
Government staff   16 
Industry experts   32 
Export and processing firms  20 
ECX staff    4 
Spot market traders:   3 
 
